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PROPOSED REVISION OF THE JURISDICTION
OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
GEORGE B. FRASER*
At the suggestion of Mr. Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Ameri-
can Law Institute studied the allocation of cases between the federal
and the state court systems.' A basic assumption of this study was
that a rational division could be made between cases that should be
tried in federal courts and those that should be tried in state courts.
The recommendations of the Institute, which are presented as
amendments to Title 28 of the United States Code, were published
in 1969.2 The publication also contains a discussion of the recom-
mendations and the memoranda on various phases of federal juris-
diction that were prepared for the members of the Institute.
The recommendations in regard to diversity of citizenship and
federal question jurisdiction are found in separate chapters which
contain the amount requirements," the venue provisions,4 the
grounds for removal' and the rules for the transfer of actions from
one federal district to another for each of these heads of jurisdic-
tion.' There is no chapter on venue or grounds for the removal of
actions, but there is a chapter on removal procedure.7 Another chap-
ter contains recommendations in regard to the raising of jurisdic-
tional issues and the tolling of the statutes of limitations for actions
that are improperly brought in a court, either federal or state, that
does not have jurisdiction to hear them.8 Other chapters contain
• Boyd Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma.
1. See STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 1
(1969) [hereinafter cited in text and footnotes as ALl STUDY].
2. Id.
3. Id. at § 1301.
4. Id. at §§ 1303-06, 1314-15, 1318 (Admiralty) and 1326.
5. Id. at §§ 1304 and 1312.
6. Id. at §§ 1306.
7. Id. at §§ 1381-84 and 1386.
8. Id. at §§ 1311-15 and 1316-19 (Admiralty). See also id. at § 1386.
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recommendations in regard to admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
actions where the United States is a party,"' abstention by the fed-
eral courts," enjoining actions in state courts," three-judge federal
courts" and actions where the defendants are so dispersed that they
are beyond the reach of any state judicial system."
In 1971, Senator Burdick introduced a bill in the United States
Senate that would amend Title 28 of the United States Code in
accordance with the Institute's recommendations. 5 Hearings on this
bill were held by the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Committee on the Judiciary during the fall of 1971
and the spring of 1972." In 1973, Senator Burdick reintroduced his
bill, 7 but several sections differ from the Institute's recommenda-
tions. Because the Judicial Conference recommended the elimina-
tion of three-judge district courts, 5 the 1973 bill provides that three-
judge courts are required only for actions that challenge the consti-
tutionality of the apportionment of congressmen or of statewide
legislative bodies. 9 Also, the recommendation in regard to actions
where defendants are so dispersed that they are beyond the reach
of any state judicial system was omitted on the ground that the
enactment of broad long-arm statutes by most states has reduced
the need for such legislation."'
DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP JURISDICTION
Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction has long been the subject
of controversy. Due to different philosophies as to the purpose of
diversity jurisdiction, some writers would expand it, others would
9. Id. at §§ 1316-19.
10. Id. at 33 1321-27.
11, Id. at § 1371.
12. Id. at § 1372.
13. See generally id. at §§ 1371-76.
14. See generally id. at §§ 2371-76. Sections 1316-19, 1321-27, 1371-76 and 2371-76 are
not within the scope of this article.
15. S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
16. Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1971) and 2d Sess., pt. 2
(1972).
17. S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
18. 1970 U.S. Jud. Conf. Proceedings 78.
19. S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1374 (1973).
20. 119 Cong. Rec. No. 78 at S9617 (daily ed. May 23, 1973).
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contract it and a few would even abolish it.2" Thus, it is not surpris-
ing that the Institute's recommendations on this subject are contro-
versial. Little can be added to what has already been written except
to point out that the increased number of cases that are brought in
federal courts requires some action.22 If the solution is a reduction
in the number of actions that can be brought in the federal courts,
the reduction should be in diversity rather than in federal question
cases. The Institute's recommendations would reduce the number
of diversity cases within the original jurisdiction of the federal
courts, but the proposals for simplifying and clarifying the law in
regard to the removal of actions would increase the number of diver-
sity cases that could be removed.23 Also, the recommendations
would increase the number of federal question cases within the origi-
nal and removal jurisdiction of the federal courts.
The Institute does not recommend any change in the statute
which authorizes federal courts to hear diversity of citizenship
cases,24 and it retains the present law in regard to the citizenship of
corporations. 25 It recommends, however, that where the law of the
state in which an action is brought permits a partnership or an
unincorporated association to sue or be sued as an entity, the part-
nership or unincorporated association shall be deemed to be a citi-
zen of the state or foreign state where it has its principal place of
business. 21 Thus, diversity of citizenship jurisdiction would exist
although there is not complete diversity between all partners or all
members of the association and the adverse party.
Another recommendation provides that an executor or an ad-
21. E.g., Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
1 (1968); Moore and Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEXAS
L. REV. 1 (1964).
22. In the last ten years filings in the district courts have increased 62 per cent, and
the number of trials has increased 80 per cent. Cromley, Schoolmaster for the Judiciary,
Sunday Oklahoman, Orbit Magazine 8, 9 (Aug. 12, 1973). See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDIC-
TION: A GENERAL VIEW 15 (1973).
23. ALI STUDY at 144-45.
24. Id. at § 1301(a). In S. 1876, 93d Cong. the amount requirement was increased to
$15,000 because the value of the dollar has decreased almost a third since 1958. Staff Memo.
on S. 1876, Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (May, 1973).
25. ALl STUDY § 1301(b)(1). However, the word "any" preceeding the word "State" in
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) is changed to "every" and the phrase "foreign state" has been added.
26. ALI STUDY § 1301(b)(2) and accompanying commentary at 114.
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ministrator of the estate of a deceased person, or a person who is
appointed pursuant to a statute to bring suit because of the death
of a decedent, shall be deemed to be a citizen of the same state as
the decedent; but this proposal would not apply where a statute
authorizes a designated person, such as a widow or a child, to bring
suit.2 This is a desirable recommendation because it prevents per-
sons from frustrating the adverse party's right to have his action
tried in a federal court by appointing a nondiverse representative.28
Further, where the citizenship of a representative is different from
that of the adverse party, the court does not have to determine if
the representative was appointed to create diversity of citizenship
or if there was some other valid reason for his appointment.29
A significant change would be made by section 1302(a) which
prohibits a plaintiff from bringing an action on the ground of diver-
sity of citizenship in a federal court in the state of which he is a
citizen. This recommendation is based on the proposition that the
federal courts should be available to out-of-state litigants who may
be prejudiced if they assert their claims in a state court. On the
other hand, in-state litigants should have no reason to fear any local
prejudice if they bring an action in a court of their own state al-
though they may wish to sue in a federal court because they prefer
federal procedure or because their case may be tried sooner at the
federal level.
This restriction is desirable, but the recommendation makes it
jurisdictional and not waivable. It is stated that this merely extends
the present law, which prohibits a defendant who is a citizen of the
state where an action is brought from removing it to a federal court,
to include plaintiffs.'" However, the present restriction is not juris-
dictional; it is waived if the removal by a defendant who is a citizen
of the state where the action is brought is not raised before the
action is tried on its merits. 3' This is desirable because nothing is
27. Id. at § 1301(b)(4) and accompanying commentary at 118.
28. See Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183 (1931).
29. See McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968).
30. ALI STuDy § 1302(a), note at 14.
31. Hadley-Mack Co. v. Godchaux Sugar Co., 2 F.2d 435 (6th Cir. 1924); Diaz v.
Montaner y Lizama, 248 F. Supp. 153 (D.P.R. 1965). See Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit
Corp., 405 U.S. 699 (1972). Section 1386(a) of the recommendations, which provides that
jurisdictional questions cannot be raised after the commencement of a trial on the merits,
would not make the result reached under the proposed law the same as the result reached
[Vol. 8
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gained by dismissing an action for lack of jurisdiction after it has
been tried. It is too late at this point to save the court's time for the
disposition of other actions.
In addition, the Institute recommends that corporations, part-
nerships, unincorporated associations and sole proprietorships that
have maintained a local establishment in a state for more than two
years be prohibited from invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court
in that state on the ground of diversity of citizenship, either origi-
nally or by removal, on any claim that arose out of the activities of
the local establishment.32 If the Institute were treating corporations
and other entities that have conducted activities within a state for
more than two years as if they were citizens of that state, the pro-
posal would be more defensible, but this proposal is not so simple
or logical. : Although it applies to entities that are "organized or
operated primarily for the purpose of conducting a trade, invest-
ment, or other business enterprise, '34 entities that engage only in
buying activities, rather than selling activities, are not within its
scope.3 1 Moreover, the restriction applies only to actions that arise
out of the activities of the local establishment. If a cause of action
arose out of activity in another state, the entity can assert its claim
in a federal court in a state where it has a local establishment. This
distinction is difficult to understand. If prejudice against the entity
does not exist where a claim arose out of activity of the local estab-
lishment, it is difficult to imagine that local prejudice would exist
where a claim arises out of activities in another state.
The commentary to the local establishment proposal states
that "Iw]hen an enterprise has for a substantial period maintained
a place of business visibly competing with local enterprises," a juror
under the present removal statute because subdivision (2) of section 1386(a) provides that a
jurisdictional defect is not waived where a party did not know the facts and could not have
discovered them in time to present them to the court whereas this is irrelevant under the
present statute.
32. ALl STUDY § 1302(b).
33. "A more arbitrary set of rules could scarcely be devised." Currie, The Federal
Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 47 (1968).
34. ALI STUDY § 1302(b) 3.
35. Id. at 126-27. It has been suggested that it might have been desirable to include
entities that engage in widespread buying in a state within this provision. Hearings on S. 1876
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 139 (1971) (statement of Richard H. Field).
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is not likely to think of it as a foreign enterprise." However, where
an out-of-state entity competes with local businesses, a juror may
be more hostile toward it than he would be toward other out-of-state
litigants. It is also stated that out-of-state entities that have main-
tained a local establishment
have become participants in the general life of the state and
have as much reason and opportunity to try to influence the
development of its legal system as domestic business organ-
izations. Whether in fact they do so or not, they are pro-
perly held to have accepted the hazards of that state's sys-
tem as it exists.37
This suggests that the entity is prevented from invoking the juris-
diction of a federal court where it maintains a local establishment
in spite of the existence of local prejudice. Moreover, this proposal
does not result in foreign and domestic entities receiving the same
treatment because the Institute would prohibit a domestic entity
from resorting to a federal court on the ground of diversity of citizen-
ship in a state of which it is a citizen to enforce claims that arise
out of activities in other states.
Even assuming that the local establishment recommendation
represents a rational restriction on the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, it should not be adopted because it contains so many provi-
sions and exceptions that extensive threshold litigation over juris-
diction is inevitable. One authority has written:
I fear also that the provisions about businesses with a "local
establishment", though rationally defensible, are so com-
plex that in this instance rationality should have been sac-
rificed in favor of clarity and efficiency of judicial adminis-
tration .38
Diversity jurisdiction is an imprecise instrument which is not avail-
able to all litigants who are the victims of prejudice and is available
36. ALl STUDY § 1302(b) and accompanying commentary at 126.
37. Id. at 109.
38. Wright, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: The American Law Institute Proposals,
26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185, 204 (1969). Accord, Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 219, 235 and 247 (1971) (statements of Howard Frick, Alfred Pelaez and
John E. Kennedy).
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to some who are not the victims of prejudice. 9 Therefore, an at-
tempt to make it more precise by imposing limitations and excep-
tions to the limitations is an exercise in futility.
If this recommendation had provided that no corporation or
other entity can invoke the jurisdiction of a district court in any
district in any state where it has been licensed to do business or has
been doing business for more than two years, it would be fairer and
easier to apply. If such a provision were approved, the clause that
makes a corporation a citizen of the state where it has its principal
place of business could be deleted."' Such a result would be desirable
because this requirement has increased threshold litigation.
Another recommendation prohibits a person who has had a
principal place of business or employment in a state for more than
two years from invoking the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of
a federal court in that state either originally or by removal.4 This
has been referred to as the "commuter" provision. It does not distin-
guish between causes of action that arise out of the commuter's
activities within the state where he has his place of business and
those arising elsewhere. If such a distinction is appropriate where
an out-of-state corporation or other entity has a local establishment,
it would appear to be appropriate here. Even this simple provision
breeds litigation and one writer states that it does not affect enough
litigants to make it worthwhile.42
One of the Institute's recommendations makes a small dent in
the rule that separate causes of action asserted by different plain-
tiffs must independently satisfy the jurisdictional requirements. It
provides that where an action is within the diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction of the federal courts jurisdiction shall extend to any
claim that is asserted by any member of the plaintiff's family living
in the same household and that arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject of the action." This proposal either
39. Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 120 (1971) (statement
of Richard H. Field).
40. See Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 37-38, 48 (1968).
41. ALl STUDY § 1302(c).
42. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 151 (1973).
43. ALI STUDY § 1301(e). Professor Moore states that this is a proposal breeding litiga-
tion because "there would be haggling over who was a member of the family." Hearings on
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goes too far or not far enough. If it is desirable to litigate separate
claims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence in one
action where only one of the claims satisfies the jurisdictional re-
quirements, the reason for limiting this proposal to members of the
same family is not clear. If a wife sues for damages for injuries
caused by the alleged negligence of a defendant, her husband should
be able to join his claim for damages for loss of consortium although
it does not satisfy the amount requirement. However, this proposal
is not limited to derivative claims.44 Thus, if the husband's automo-
bile is damaged in the same collision, he can join his claim with his
wife's so that the separate claims would not have to be litigated in
two different forums.45 The same reasoning indicates that if the wife
borrows a neighbor's automobile which is damaged in the same
collision, the neighbor should be allowed to assert his claim in the
wife's action. Joinder of these claims would not impose a great bur-
den on the federal courts because they involve common questions
of law and fact whereas requiring separate suits in different courts
would impose a great burden on the litigants, the witnesses and the
court system as a whole. Consequently, where a claim meets the
jurisdictional requirements, other persons whose claims arise out of
the same transaction or occurrence should be allowed to join as
plaintiffs without regard to the amount of their claim provided di-
versity of citizenship exists. Such a provision would be consistent
with Strawbridge v. Curtiss,4" although some writers would reject
the rule in this case. In one article it is suggested that
a simple jurisdictional statute is needed that will imple-
ment the Federal Rules. Thus, with claims and parties pro-
cedurally qualified for joinder, if there is federal jurisdic-
tion to support one claim, that should end the jurisdiction
problems. 7
S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 193 (1971). See Currie, The Federal Courts
and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 297 (1969).
44. Derivative claims refers to claims for damages that are asserted by a spouse or a
parent that arise out of injuries to the other party to the marriage or to a child whether or
not the state law requires the claim to be joined with that of the injured party or gives any
effect to a judgment on one claim in an action on the other.
45. Hearings on S. 1876 Before Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 149 (1971) (statement of
Richard H. Field).
46. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
47. Moore and Wicker, Federal Jurisdiction: A Proposal to Simplify the System to Meet
[Vol. 8
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Although not suggested by the American Law Institute, the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear counterclaims should be
expanded. Thus, where a federal court has jurisdiction of an action
for the recovery of a money judgment, the defendant should be
allowed to assert a claim for the recovery of money without satisfy-
ing the jurisdictional requirements despite the fact that his claim
does not arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the basis
of the plaintiff's claim. No time will be saved by the court or the
witnesses by trying these claims in one suit, but their joinder will
prevent the plaintiff from enforcing his judgment and disposing of
the money received before the defendant obtains a judgment on his
claim in another action.
The desirability of allowing a defendant to assert an unrelated
claim for the recovery of money in an action in which the plaintiff
seeks to recover a money judgment has long been recognized in
equity, and over two hundred and fifty years ago statutes authorized
set-offs in actions at law.4" Originally, a defendant could set-off only
certain types of claims, but modern statutes have expanded the
claims that can be asserted as a set-off.49 In 1938 the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure authorized defendants to plead any unrelated
claim as a counterclaim against the plaintiff, 0 but the beneficial
effect of this rule has been limited by the requirement that the claim
must independently satisfy the diversity and amount require-
ments..5 1
It has been suggested that a defendant may assert an unrelated
claim against the plaintiff to reduce the plaintiffs recovery but that
the defendant cannot obtain an affirmative judgment.2 But, if a
court has jurisdiction to hear an unrelated counterclaim to reduce
the plaintiffs recovery, permitting the court to grant a judgment for
the Needs of a Complex Society, 1 FLA. S.U.L. REV. 1, 7 (1973). See Currie, The Federal
Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 18 (1968). This rule does not
apply to actions that are removed to a federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1970).
48. C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 635 (2d ed. 1947).
49. E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 324 (1971), which permits a defendant to assert a
claim for a money judgment in an action where the plaintiff is seeking to recover a money
judgment although the claims are for unliquidated tort damages.
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
51. Counterclaims that arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the basis of
the plaintiff's action are within the ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts. E.g., Moore v.
New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
52. 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTE 13.19[1] (2d ed. 1972).
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the defendant where his claim is for a larger sum than the plaintiffs
would not impose any significant additional burden on the federal
courts and would result in a more efficient administration of jus-
tice .53 Moreover, the view that a court can have jurisdiction over a
claim for only certain purposes, such as to reduce the plaintiff's
recovery, is questionable. This change should be made in both the
diversity of citizenship and the federal question sections of the Judi-
cial Code.
REMOVAL OF ACTIONS
Revision of the statutes which authorize the removal of actions
is necessary because there are numerous areas where the law is not
clear and the cases are in conflict. One judge stated "[t]hat there
is no other phase of American jurisprudence with so many refine-
ments and subtleties, as relate to removal proceedings, is known by
all who have to deal with them. ' ' 54 The existing law governing the
removal of actions on the grounds of diversity of citizenship and
federal question, and the recommendations in regard to the removal
of diversity actions will be discussed, but the primary discussion of
the recommendations in regard to the removal of federal question
cases will be found in the next section.
Single Defendant
Under the present law, a defendant cannot remove an action
from a state court to a federal court on the ground of diversity of
citizenship if he is a citizen of the state where the action is brought,5
but this limitation is waived if no objection to the removal is raised
before trial.56 The Institute would continue this limitation as a juris-
53. See United States v. Heyward-Robinson Co., Inc., 430 F.2d 1077, 1087 (2d Cir. 1970)
(concurring opinion). See Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the
Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27, 31-34 (1963); Green, Federal Jurisdiction Over Counterclaims,
48 Nw. U.L. REV. 271 (1953).
54. Hagerla v. Mississippi River Power Co., 202 F. 771, 773 (S.D. Iowa 1912). This
statement was quoted with approval in Bradley v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 100
F. Supp. 913, 915 (E.D. Okla. 1951).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1970).
56. Monroe v. United Carbon Co., 196 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1952); Donohue v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc., 194 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1952). See Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp.,
405 U.S. 699 (1972).
Other statutory requirements are waived where not promptly raised. Mackay v. Unita
Development Co., 229 U.S. 173 (1938) (amount in controversy where a counterclaim exceeds
the statutory requirement); Weeks v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 218 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1955) (time
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1974], Art. 1
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dictional requirement.57 As indicated earlier, making this restriction
jurisdictional is undesirable.
Another recommendation prevents a corporation from remov-
ing an action that is brought in a state where it has maintained a
local establishment for two years if the claim arose out of the activi-
ties of that establishment. Furthermore, the Institute would prevent
an individual from removing an action that is brought in a state
where he has maintained his principal place of business or employ-
ment for two years. 5 These restrictions are undesirable because they
encourage litigation.
Counterclaims
Under the present law a plaintiff cannot remove an action
though a counterclaim is asserted against him, 9 but the Institute
would change this rule for both diversity of citizenship and federal
question cases. The diversity of citizenship chapter provides that a
plaintiff can remove a counterclaim that is asserted against him
where he could have removed the claim if it had been asserted
against him as a defendant. If the counterclaim arose out of the
same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim, the whole
action shall be removed."'
Most cases do not allow a defendant to remove an action on the
basis of a counterclaim, whether permissive or compulsory, which
he asserts," but this is another rule that the Institute would change
for both diversity of citizenship and federal question cases. In the
diversity chapter it is recommended that a defendant be allowed to
remove an action, although the amount claimed by the plaintiff
does not satisfy the statutory requirement, where the defendant will
to remove); Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 194 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1952) (all defen-
dants must join in removal); Green v. Zuck, 133 F. Supp. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (time to
remove). A defendant may cure certain defects after the time to remove the action has
expired. E.g., Covington v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 251 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1958) (file copies of
process, pleadings and orders); Henelopen Hotel Corp. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 213 F. Supp. 320
(D. Del. 1963) (verify removal petition). See Riehl v. National Mutual Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 739
(7th Cir. 1967); Kramer v. Jarvis, 81 F. Supp. 360 (D. Neb. 1948) (failure to file bond can be
waived but not cured).
57. ALI STUDY § 1302(a), n.19.
58. Id. at § 1304(a) (incorporating § 1302).
59. Shamrock Oil Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941).
60. ALI STuDY § 1304(c).
61. Barnes v. Parker, 126 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
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assert a counterclaim arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the basis of the plaintiff's claim and the matter in contro-
versy in the counterclaim exceeds the sum or value of $15,000.2
Multiple Defendants
The present statute provides that all defendants must join in
removing an action.13 This has been a troublesome requirement,
particularly in diversity actions, because a plaintiff may join a per-
son whose citizenship is the same as the plaintiff's or who is a citizen
of the state where the action is brought to prevent removal. If the
plaintiff has a substantial claim against a defendant, his joinder is
not fraudulent although the plaintiff does not intend to enforce a
judgment against him or he is judgment proof, which is often the
situation when an employee is joined as a co-defendant with his
employer and the only reason for joining him was to prevent the
removal of the action." However, where the plaintiff does not have
a valid claim against a defendant whose joinder prevents removal,
the other defendant can remove the action and show by depositions,
answers to interrogatories and other evidentiary type materials that
the plaintiff does not have a substantial claim against the co-
defendant. 5 This is frequently referred to as fraudulent joinder, but
the removing party does not have to prove any actual fraud on the
plaintiff's part.6
Where a plaintiff fails to state a claim against a defendant
whose joinder prevents the removal of the action, the other defen-
dant can remove it at once, 7 but the plaintiff can amend his plead-
ing in the federal court.18 Therefore, the action should be removed
62. ALl STUDY § 1304(d). The recommendation was for $10,000, but this was raised to
$15,000 in the 1973 bill. S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1304(d) (1973).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1970).
A4 0iiinn u Post, 969 F. Sup 59 (S..NY !967j if1'
65. E.g., Wecker v. National Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176 (1907).
66. Id. Accord, Dodd v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 82 (10th Cir. 1964).
67. E.g., Seigler v. American Surety Co., 151 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Cal. 1957); Alabama
Vermiculite Corp. v. Patterson, 149 F. Supp. 534 (W.D.S.C. 1955).
68. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Schwyhart, 227 U.S. 184 (1913); Ingersoll v. Pearl Assur.
Co., 153 F. Supp. 558 (N.D. Cal. 1957). In Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 126 F.2d 710 (9th Cir.
1942), the court refused to allow the plaintiff to amend on the ground that jurisdiction of a
federal court is based on the facts alleged at the time of removal and that the court cannot
be deprived of jurisdiction by an amendment. This court failed to distinguish between an
amendment that changes the allegations, such as reducing the amount claimed, and an
amendment that perfects defective allegations.
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only if it can be shown that the plaintiff has no substantial claim
against the other defendant. Moreover, a defendant should not wait
until the state court holds that the petition does not state a claim
against his co-defendant before removing an action." Since he could
have removed it earlier by showing that the plaintiff did not have a
substantial claim against the other defendant, removal time may
have expired. In addition, dismissal of a party by a trial court does
not make an action removable because it is not a final order.
If a plaintiff dismisses his claim against a defendant whose
joinder prevents its removal, the other defendant can remove it;70
however, if the trial has started, he must act at once." A different
result is reached where a court sustains a demurrer to the petition
or grants a motion for a directed verdict that is asserted by the party
whose joinder prevented removal. The action is not immediately
removable because the decision of the trial court may be reversed
on appeal; but when the order becomes final, the other defendant
can remove the action.72
Will the death of a party whose joinder prevented the removal
of an action permit it to be removed? Cases have gone both ways
on this issue.7"
Where a defendant who is not a citizen of the state where the
action is brought has not been served with process, another defen-
dant can immediately remove the action, but where the non-served
defendant is a citizen of the state where the action is brought, an-
other defendant cannot remove it until the plaintiff dismisses or
abandons his claim against the non-served defendant.74 However, a
few cases" hold that a defendant who is not a citizen of the state
where the action is brought can remove an action before defendants
69. Contra, Platt v. Illinois Cent. Rd., 305 F.2d 136 (5th Cir. 1962).
70. Powers v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 169 U.S. 92 (1898).
71. Waldron v. Skelly Oil Co., 101 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Mo. 1951).
72. Note, Federal Practice: Removal After Resident Defendant Is Involuntarily Dis-
missed, 17 OKLA. L. REV. 336 (1964).
73. Rick v. Headrick, 167 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Mo. 1958) (deny removal); Bradley v.
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 100 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Okla. 1951) (grant removal).
74. E.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Safeway Steel Scaffolds Co., 191 F. Supp. 220 (N.D.
Ala. 1961). These cases rely on Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534 (1939), although it was
decided before the statute was amended in 1948. See Note, Several Defendants with Service
Upon One, 7 OKLA. L.J. 457 (1954).
75. Duff v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 287 F. Supp. 13 (N.D. Okla. 1968); Robertson v. Nye,
275 F. Supp. 497 (W.D. Okla. 1967).
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who are citizens of that state are served because the statute provides
that the action is removable "only if none of the parties in interest
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in
which such action is brought. '7 This is the better view. Where an
action is removed on the ground that it arises under the Constitu-
tion, laws and treaties of the United States the citizenship of a non-
served party is unimportant.77 Also, most courts hold that a party
who is not served does not have to join in the removal petition. 71
Section 1441(c) permits a defendant to remove an action
"[w]henever a separate and independent claim or cause of action,
which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or
more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action.17 The
lower federal courts have not agreed as to what constitutes a sepa-
rate and independent claim or cause of action, and the only Su-
preme Court case dealing with the question, American Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Finn,"' holds that an action does not contain a
separate and independent claim where a plaintiff is entitled to only
one recovery for a single wrong arising from an interlocked series of
transactions although the plaintiff sues the defendants in the alter-
native and he could have sued them in separate actions. Perhaps a
separate and independent claim or cause of action exists if a recov-
ery from one defendant does not bar the plaintiff from recovering
from another defendant."
The Institute's recommendation avoids these problems by per-
mitting a defendant who could have removed an action if he were
the only defendant to remove the entire action to the district court.8 2
Where jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the federal
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
77. S. E. Overton Co. v. International Brotherhood, 115 F. Supp. 764, 772 (W.D. Mich.
1953).
78. Nelson v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 130 F. Supp. 59 (D.N.J. 1955). A few courts hold
that all named defendants must join in the removal petition. Rodriguez v. Union Oil Co.,
121 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1970). This language was used in 1948 to prevent the confusion
that was caused by the language in the prior statute.
80. 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
81. E.g., Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Stanolind 0. & G. Co., 251 F.2d 412 (8th Cir.
1958); Baltimore Gas & Elect. Co. v. U.S.F. & G., 159 F. Supp. 738 (D. Md. 1958) (separate
but pro-rata liability under separate contracts). See Northside I. & M. Co., Inc. v. Dobson &
Johnson, Inc., 480 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1973) (where plaintiffs assert separate claims).
82. ALI STUDY §§ 1304(b) (diversity of citizenship), 1312(a)(1) (federal question).
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court may remand all matters that, considered separately, are not
within its jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction is based on a federal
question, the federal court shall remand all claims that do not arise
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States or are
not within the pendent jurisdiction of the federal court. 4
Although this recommendation would increase the number of
cases that can be removed, it is desirable because it simplifies and
clarifies the law in regard to removal. Moreover, permitting one
defendant to remove an action that is brought against several defen-
dants would enable an out-of-state defendant to avoid local preju-
dice by removing the action to a federal court where a co-defendant
is a citizen of the state where the action is brought. 5
Third-Party Claims
The present law in regard to the removal of actions by third-
party defendants is in a state of confusion. Many courts hold that a
third-party defendant cannot remove an action although he could
have removed the third-party claim if it were a separate action.
These courts hold that section 1441(c)" does not authorize the re-
moval because the third-party claim was not joined with the original
claim by the plaintiff.87 However, other courts permit a third-party
defendant to remove an action where the original and the third-
party claims involve different issues and facts, but the original
claim will be remanded to the state court." One case allowed a
third-party claim to be removed after the state court separated the
original and the third-party claims for trial.89 Section 1304(b) of the
Study resolves part of this confusion by specifically authorizing a
third-party defendant to remove an action where he could have
removed the third-party claim on the ground of diversity of citizen-
83. Id. at § 1304(b).
84. Id. at § 1313(b).
85. Id. at 144.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1970).
87. E.g., Greater N.Y. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Anchor Construction Co., Inc., 326 F. Supp.
245 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Tuyagda Aluminum Products Corp. v. Hull Dobbs 65th Inf. Ford, Inc.,
313 F. Supp. 774 (D.P.R. 1970).
88. E.g., Ted Lokey R.E. Co. v. Gentry, 336 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Tex. 1972) (removed
as separate contracts in each claim); First Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Port Lavaca Vending
Mach., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 375 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (not removed as same issues and evidence in
both claims).
89. Central of Georgia R.R. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 426 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1970).
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ship if it were the only claim being litigated, but the court may
remand all matters that are not within its original jurisdiction. If
such a remand is ordered, the court must remand the rest of the
action on the request of the removing party. However, there is no
similar provision for removal where the claim asserted against the
third-party defendant arose under the Constitution, laws or treaties
of the United States.!" The Commentary to section 1312(a) states
why a third-party plaintiff should not be allowed to remove an
action where the third-party petition asserts a federal question, but
it does not indicate why a third-party defendant should not be al-
lowed to remove the action."' Since a third-party defendant should
be able to remove an action where the third-party petition asserts a
federal question, the phrase "or third-party defendant" should be
added to subdivisions (1) and (2) of section 1312(a). Also, subdivi-
sion (2) should be changed to permit a third-party plaintiff to re-
move an action where a right arising under the Constitution, laws
and treaties of the United States is asserted as a defense to his third-
party claim. These changes would make this section consistent with
other recommendations in regard to federal question jurisdiction.
As discussed previously, section 1304(c) permits a plaintiff to
remove an action when a counterclaim is asserted against him which
he could have removed on the ground of diversity of citizenship if
he had been sued as a defendant. This subsection should be ex-
panded to permit a third-party plaintiff to remove an action under
the same condition. Section 1312(a)(3) permits a third-party plain-
tiff to remove an action if a counterclaim which asserts a claim
arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United
States is asserted against him by the third-party defendant. Also,
this section permits a third-party defendant who asserts a counter-
claim that is compulsory under state law and that asserts a claim
arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States
to remove the netion, 9 2
Cross- Claims
The present cases hold that a defendant against whom a cross-
90. Compare ALl STUDY § 1304(b) with § 1312(a).
91. ALI STUDY at 197.
92. The original recommendation would not permit this, but the bill that was intro-
duced in the Senate in 1973 substituted the word "party" for "defendant" in § 1312(a)(3).
S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1312(a)(3) (1973).
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claim is asserted cannot remove the action although as between the
two defendants the statutory requirements for removal are satisfied.
This result is reached on the ground that the cross-claim is not a
separate and independent claim or cause of action." Sections
1304(b) (diversity of citizenship) and 1312(a)(1) (federal question)
appear to change this rule because they provide that any defendant
against whom a claim is asserted which he could have removed if
sued alone or which could have been the basis of an action in a
federal court can remove the action. These sections do not state that
the claim must be asserted by the plaintiff, and section 1304(b)
states that the claim may be asserted by any party. Permitting the
action to be removed is desirable because it is difficult to distinguish
between a claim asserted against a third-party defendant and a
claim asserted against a co-defendant. However, the limitation im-
posed in the second sentence of section 1304(b) should apply to
defendants against whom a cross-claim is asserted.
FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
The Institute's proposals make several significant changes in
the jurisdiction of federal courts over actions that arise under the
Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States. Section 1311(a)
provides that
the district courts shall have original jurisdiction without
regard to amount in controversy of all civil actions, includ-
ing those for a declaratory judgment, in which the initial
pleading sets forth a substantial claim arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
Thus, this recommendation deletes the amount in controversy re-
quirement, and it includes the requirement that the federal question
must appear from the essential allegations of the complaint. Also,
it rejects the rule in Shelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. 15 that
the federal courts do not have jurisdiction of an action for declara-
tory relief where the plaintiff could have brought an action for coer-
cive relief unless the federal courts have jurisdiction of the action
93. Verschell v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 257 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Sequoyah
Feed & Supply Co. v. Patterson, 101 F. Supp. 680 (W.D. Ark. 1951).
94. ALI STUDY § 1311(a).
95. 339 U.S. 667 (1950). See also ALl STUDY at 170.
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for coercive relief. Another recommendation provides for nationwide
service of process in federal question cases. 6
The removal recommendation permits a single defendant to
remove an action to a federal court where the plaintiff's claim arose
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States regard-
less of the amount in controversy. Also, it permits either party to
remove an action where the amount in controversy exceeds $15,000
and the defendant asserts a defense arising under the Constitution,
laws or treaties of the United States.97 The desirability of providing
a federal forum for such actions is not questioned, but the amount
requirement is imposed to prevent the federal courts from being
overburdened by the removal of such actions." This restriction is
undesirable where the defense arises under a federal statute because
the federal courts should construe federal statutes to avoid a restric-
tive construction by a state court. Even where a defense arises under
the Constitution of the United States an amount requirement is
undesirable although it may be necessary to restrict the number of
actions that can be removed.
Another recommendation permits a party against whom a
counterclaim is asserted to remove the action if the counterclaim
sets forth a claim arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties
of the United States. Also, the party asserting the counterclaim can
remove the action if the counterclaim is compulsory under state
law. 8 This recommendation permits removal by third-party plain-
tiffs and third-party defendants as well as by original plaintiffs and
defendants.
At the present time, removal jurisdiction is deemed to be deriv-
ative so that an action can be removed only if the state court has
subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, an action within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts cannot be removed from a state
- r _ 3 __ 1 111i ri-fl . . . . I I I ,I - . .
court tO a feerl Cou rt. I111 is iiiubisusesiiwan Lihe enicient
96. ALI STUDY § 1314(d).
97. Id. at § 1312(a). The amount in the recommendation was $10,000, but this was
increased to $15,000 in the 1973 Senate bill. S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1312(a)(2) (1973).
98. Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 734-40 (1972) (statement
of Judge Henry J. Friendly).
99. ALI STUDY § 1312(a)(3). The 1973 Senate bill substituted the word "party" for the
word "defendant." S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
100. E.g., General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 260 U.S. 261 (1922).
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administration of justice, and it is not required by either the Consti-
tution or the Judicial Code. Section 1312(d) of the recommenda-
tions rejects this rule. Instead, it provides that an action which is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts can be re-
moved to a federal court by any party. This is a desirable recom-
mendation. However, it should be amended to permit a party who
has removed an action to a federal court on the ground that it is
within its exclusive jurisdiction to appeal from an order that re-
mands the action to the state court. Section 1312(d) also provides
that a federal court shall have jurisdiction of an action that is im-
properly filed therein where the defendant asserts a defense or a
counterclaim that would have permitted the action to be removed
to the federal court.
REMOVAL PROCEDURE
The Institute's recommendations make only minor changes in
the procedure for removing actions. They provide that the removal
petition shall state the grounds for removal, rather than the facts,
which entitle the defendant to remove the action and that the peti-
tion must be certified in accordance with Rule 11 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure"" rather than being verified. Further, the Institute
would not require a removal bond."'"
Some decisions hold that a defect in the jurisdictional allega-
tions in a removal petition can be amended after the time to remove
an action has run but that an omission cannot be cured. Moreover,
they hold that the failure to allege a party's citizenship, although
his place of residence is alleged, or the failure to allege a corpora-
tion's principal place of business, although its state of incorporation
is alleged, are omissions which cannot be corrected after the removal
time has expired. " : Several later cases have rejected this strict con-
struction of the right to amend a removal petition.' 4 Also, the com-
mentary to Section 1381(a) rejects the strict view by indicating that
Fraser, Some Problems in Federal Question Jurisdiction, 49 MICH. L. REV. 73, 84 (1950).
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
102. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) and (d) (1970) with ALI STUDY § 1381(a) and ac-
companying commentary at 338-39.
103. See Note, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice: Amending Pleading to Include Alle-
gation of Principal Place of Business, 13 OKLA. L. REV. 73 (1960).
104. E.g., Luehers v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1971). See Kinney
v. Columbia Savings & Loan Ass'n, 191 U.S. 78 (1903).
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requiring a party to state the grounds for removal makes it easier
for courts to allow an amendment. "5 However, the recommenda-
tions do not appear to affect the rule that a defendant cannot
change his ground for removal after the time to remove the action
has expired."'
The present law"'7 provides that notice of the removal of an
action shall be given to adverse parties whereas section 1381(b) of
the recommendations provides that notice shall be given to all par-
ties to the action. Both the present law and the recommendation
require the removing party to file a copy of the removal petition with
the clerk of the state court. The present law provides that this must
be done promptly after the filing of the removal petition in the
federal court and that the filing of the copy with the clerk of the
state court "shall effect the removal." However, the provision that
the removing party must act promptly was not included in section
1381(c). Instead, section 1382(f) of the recommendations provides
that the notice does not have to be given to the adverse parties and
the copy does not have to be filed with the clerk of the state court
within the time for filing the removal petition although "the re-
moval is not effective until [such steps] have been taken"'0" and
the action may be remanded if they are unduly delayed.'10 Thus, the
recommendation does not encourage prompt action although it im-
poses a penalty for being dilatory.
The statement in the present law that the filing of a copy of the
removal petition with the clerk of the state court "shall effect the
removal" has been a source of confusion. Some cases hold that the
federal court has jurisdiction from the time the removal petition is
filed with it, some hold that the state court has jurisdiction until a
copy of the removal petition is filed with it and some hold that both
courts have jurisdiction until a copy of the petition is filed with the
,tpt cnurt. "" Since the recommendation uses such similar laguage
it may not resolve this conflict. The commentary states that the
state court should not lose jurisdiction of an action until it has been
105. ALl STUDY at 340-41.
106. Alvey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 162 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1970).
108. ALl STUDY at 357.
109. Id. at 355.
110. Id. at 356-57.
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given notice of the removal,"' but this statement is not inconsistent
with the view that both courts have jurisdiction until the state court
is notified of the removal. Prompt action by the removing party
would minimize this problem. Therefore, section 1381(b) should be
changed to provide that either before or promptly after the filing of
the removal petition notice should be given to all parties to the
action and a copy of the petition filed with the clerk of the state
court."12
The Judicial Code provides:
[I]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not remova-
ble, a petition for removal may be filed within thirty days
after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise,
of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order, or other
paper from which it may be first ascertained that the case
is one which is or has become removable."3
The phrase "amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper" is
needed in those cases where a plaintiff dismisses a party without
amending his pleading as long as all defendants must join in the
removal,"' but it has been misused in some cases. For instance,
several cases have allowed a defendant to remove an action after he
has taken a deposition which reveals that the action was initially
removable. '" Since the recommendations permit one of several de-
fendants to remove an action, the words "motion, order, or other
paper" are properly omitted. Thus, a late removal would be allowed
only where there is an amended pleading from which it may be
ascertained that a nonremovable case has become removable."
This section permits the amending party to remove within thirty
days after the service of the original pleading. However, it should
be revised to prevent him from removing the action after the trial
has commenced.
111. Id, at 357.
112. See also id. at § 1382(f), which should also be made part of § 1381(b).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1970).
114. E.g., Jong v. General Motors Corp., 359 F. Supp. 223 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
115. E.g., Fisher v. United Airlines, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (parties are
of diverse citizenship); Fuqua v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry., 206 F. Supp. 814 (E.D. Okla. 1962)
(plaintiff has no substantial claim against co-defendant). See Note, Federal Jurisdiction and
Practice: Timeliness and Removal, 16 OKLA. L. REV. 215 (1963).
116. ALI STUDY § 1382(c). This section permits the amending party to remove within
thirty days after the service of the original pleading. However, it should be revised to prevent
him from removing the action if the trial has commenced.
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VENUE
Except for the provisions in regard to the venue of actions by
and against corporations, the present venue statutes have not
proved to be unsatisfactory. It is not clear whether the section in
regard to corporations"7 applies where a corporation is a plaintiff or
only where it is a defendant; however, most courts hold that it
applies only to corporate defendants."' Also, this section indicates
that where there is a corporate defendant, venue may be laid in any
district in its state of incorporation and in any district in any state
where it is licensed to do business; but some cases limit venue to
the district where the corporation has a place of business."' The
Institute proposes that for venue purposes a corporation shall be
regarded as a resident of the district where it has its principal place
of business and a resident of each district in its state of incorpora-
tion if its principal place of business is not there.2 0
The present law contains no provision in regard to the venue of
actions by or against partnerships and other unincorporated asso-
ciations although the Supreme Court has held that where an action
arises under the laws of the United States a partnership can be sued
wherever it is doing business. 2' The Institute has proposed that for
venue purposes a partnership or an unincorporated association shall
be regarded as a resident of the district where it has its principal
place of business. 2 '
Another proposal abolishes the rule that actions for trespass
upon or harm to land must be brought where the land is located.2 3
This change is desirable, but it should be extended to include ac-
tions for an injunction to prevent a threatened or continued trespass
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
118. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 155-56 (2d ed. 1970).
119. Note, Federal Practice: Venue in Actions Against Corporations, 19 OKLA. L. REv.
197 (1966); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 154 (2d ed. 1970).
120. All hough found in different sections, the venue provision for corporations is the
same for diversity and federal question cases. ALI STUDY §§ 1303(b) (diversity) and 1314(b)
(federal question). Therefore, it is questionable if they should be in different sections. Re-
search would be easier and the construction would be more uniform if only one section were
involved.
121. Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556 (1967).
122. ALI STUDY §§ 1303(b) (diversity jurisdiction) and 1314(b) (federal question juris-
diction).
123. Id. at §§ 1303(c) (diversity jurisdiction) and 1314(c) (federal question jurisdic-
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or injury to land.
The Institute's recommendations in regard to the transfer of
actions from one district to another are more involved than the
provisions in the present law because three different rules have been
proposed. Where jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship,
and the defendant is the moving party, an action may be transferred
to any district except one where any plaintiff and all defendants
cannot invoke federal jurisdiction.'24 Where jurisdiction is based on
diversity of citizenship and the plaintiff is the moving party, an
action may be transferred to any district where venue would be
proper and the defendants are amenable to process except a district
where any plaintiff cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the federal
court. 2 ' Where jurisdiction is based on the existence of a federal
question, an action may be transferred to any other district.'2
FORECLOSURE OF JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
Section 1386(a) of the Institute's recommendations contains a
novel but valuable proposal. It provides that after the commence-
ment of the trial on the merits neither the court nor a party may
question jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action except
where the court defers a decision on jurisdiction, a party did not
know and could not discover the jurisdictional facts earlier, the
parties attempted to confer jurisdiction by collusion, the issue is
raised on appeal by a party who has previously challenged the juris-
diction of the court or a consideration of the jurisdiction of the court
is required by the Constitution.
At the present time an action may be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter after it has been tried on its
merits even though the issue of jurisdiction was not raised before the
trial. One of the leading illustrations of this wasteful procedure is
Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley. 27 In this case the plain-
tiffs brought an action in a federal court to enforce a promise by the
defendant railroad to issue passes, alleging that the railroad claimed
that a federal act made it illegal to issue the passes. The question
of jurisdiction was not raised in the trial court and a decree on the
124. Id. at § 1305.
125. Id. at § 1306.
126. Id. at § 1315.
127. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
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merits was rendered for the plaintiffs. The action was appealed to
the United States Supreme Court which raised the question of juris-
diction on its own motion. Since the reference to the federal act was
not one of the essential allegations of the complaint, the Court held
that the trial court did not have jurisdiction of the action. Therefore,
the action was reversed and remanded with instructions that it be
dismissed. Thereafter, it was filed in a state court, and three years
later it again reached the Supreme Court where it was heard on its
merits. Section 1386(a) would prevent a repetition of the Mottley
case. 128
The desirability of section 1386(a) is reduced by its exceptions.
One exception permits a party to question jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter of the action after the trial on the merits where he did
not know and could not discover the facts that affect jurisdiction
before the trial. This is undesirable because the hardship that would
be imposed on the courts, the witnesses and the jurors, if any, and
the adverse party by retrying the case in a state court outweighs any
hardship that might be imposed on a party by having his action
tried in a federal court. 29 Moreover, the burden on the federal court
is not reduced by retrying the action in a state court. For similar
reasons the exception which permits an objection to the jurisdiction
of the court to be reviewed on appeal is undesirable. The harm that
would be caused by retrying the action in a state court would be
great whereas it is doubtful that litigating the dispute in a federal
court harmed the defendant. Moreover, dismissing the action after
it has been tried on its merits would not benefit the federal court.
Although it may be desirable to provide that the matter in
controversy must exceed a certain sum or value, the figure selected
is arbitrary. For this reason, an exact determinaiton of the amount
involved in an action is not necessary, and preventing an appellate
conurt frnm reviewing a dneciirn this issue ; ",ot ccmp41m
the integrity of the federal judicial system. One authority has stated
that
128. Section 1312(d), which provides that a district court has jurisdiction of an action
that could have been removed to a federal court because a defense arising under the Constitu-
tion, laws or treaties of the United States is asserted would prevent a repetition of the Mottle)
case only if the amount in controversy exceeds $15,000.
129. "The doctrine of harmless error should apply to jurisdictional matters as it does
to procedural matters." Moore and Wicker, Federal Jurisdiction: A Proposal to Simplify the
System to Meet the Needs of a Complex Society, I FLA. S.U.L. REV. 1, 4 (1973).
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the jurisdictional amount requirement is really a house-
keeping device to keep out petty cases and should not be a
trap for the litigant to find out five years later when he gets
to the U.S. Supreme Court that no jurisdiction exists.""4
Similarly, after an action has been tried on its merits, the power of
an appellate court to review a trial court's decision that either diver-
sity of citizenship or federal question jurisdiction exists should be
limited to determining if there is minimal diversity or if the action
involves a federal question. Thus, if any two adverse parties are
citizens of different states, or if either party asserted a substantial
claim or defense arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of
the United States, the action should not be reversed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
Proposed section 1386(b) provides that if an action that was
timely commenced in a federal court is dismissed for lack of juris-
diction over the subject matter, a new action may be brought in
another court, regardless of that jurisdiction's statute of limitations,
provided that the statute would not have barred the original action
and the new action is brought within 30 days or such longer period
as the new jurisdiction allows. Section 1386(c) contains a similar
provision to cover cases which a state court dismisses on the ground
that they are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Both of these recommendations fill gaps in the present law.'3 '
CONCLUSION
The American Law Institute is to be commended for its schol-
arly study of the jurisdiction of the federal district courts. Whether
or not its recommendations make a principled division of cases be-
tween the two judicial systems depends on a person's hypothesis as
to the purpose of federal courts.
Several changes in the Institute's recommendations have been
suggested because it is believed that an exact division of cases is not
130. Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciar', 92d Cong.. 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 229 (1971) (statement
of William Van Dercreek). The abolition of an amount requirement for diversity cases has
been advocated. Moore and Wicker, Federal Jurisdiction: A Proposal to Simplify the System
to meet the Needs of a Complex Society, 1 FLA. S.U.L. REv. 1, 11 (1973).
131. Subsections (b) & (c) should be separate sections because their subject matter is
unrelated to the provisions of subsection (a).
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the only criterion,' :2 but that the efficient administration of justice
should also be considered. In an effort to achieve perfection, the
requirements for federal jurisdiction should not contain so many
limitations, and exceptions to those limitations, that extensive pre-
liminary litigation is required. "In the interest of federalism, logic,
and rationalization of the federal system, experts too often propose
a scheme that is far too complicated to produce expeditious and just
results."' ' Another authority has stated that "[i]f we must choose
between a reasoned division of jurisdiction and a workable division
of jurisdiction, I would choose the latter every time."'' 4 The local
establishment recommendation is an illustration of a proposal
which breeds litigation. However, the suggestion that minor changes
should be made in several proposals should not detract from the
value of this study. Revision of the jurisdiction of the federal district
courts is necessary, and the American Law Institute's recommenda-
tions should be the basis of any legislation that is passed.
132. Wright, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: The American Law Institute
Proposals, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185, 187 (1969).
133. Moore and Wicker, Federal Jurisdiction: A Proposal to Simplify the System to
Meet the Needs of a Complex Society, I FLA. S.U.L. REV. 1, 2 (1973).
134. Wright, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: The American Law Institute
Proposals, 26 WASh. & LEE L. REV. 185, 207 (1969). The Institute recognizes the importance
of avoiding threshold litigation, but it indicates that a clear statement of the law will have
this effect. ALI STUDY at 128. However, the application of a clearly stated rule to the facts
can cause threshold litigation.
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